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Abstract. This paper analyzes repeated multimarket contact with ob-
servation errors where two players operate in multiple markets simulta-
neously. Multimarket contact has received much attention in economics,
management, and so on. Despite vast empirical studies that examine
whether multimarket contact fosters cooperation or collusion, little is
theoretically known as to how players behave in an equilibrium when
each player receives a noisy and different observation or signal indicating
other firms’ actions (private monitoring). To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to construct a strategy designed for multiple markets
whose per-market equilibrium payoffs exceed one for a single market, in
our setting. We first construct an entirely novel strategy whose behavior
is specified by a non-linear function of the signal configurations. We then
show that the per-market equilibrium payoff improves when the number
of markets is sufficiently large.
1 Introduction
This paper analyzes repeated multimarket contact with observation errors where
two players operate in multiple markets simultaneously. A firm, e.g., Uber, pro-
vides its taxi service in multiple distinct markets (areas) and determines its
price or allocation in each area, facing an oligopolistic competition, which is of-
ten modeled as a prisoners’ dilemma (PD). To improve profits, it is inevitably
helpful to realize how the firm’s rival should behave in an equilibrium. Alterna-
tively, it is pointed out that tacit collusion among firms is likely to occur [7]. It
is also desirable for a regulatory agency to theoretically understand the extent
of the profits firms earn by collusion.
However, despite vast empirical studies [23] that have examined whether mul-
timarket contact fosters cooperation or collusion, little is theoretically known as
to how players behave in an equilibrium when each player receives a noisy ob-
servation or signal of other firms’ actions. Without noisy observation, i.e., under
perfect monitoring, where each player can observe his opponents’ actions, there
exists no strategy designed for multiple markets whose per-market equilibrium
payoff exceeds one for a single market [3]. With noisy observation, one exception
is a case where players do share common information, i.e., public monitoring
where all players always observe a noisy, but common signal. A generalization of
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2trigger strategies attains greater per-market equilibrium payoffs than the single-
market equilibrium, assuming a public randomization device [14].
In contrast, this paper considers a different, but realistic noisy situation where
players do not share common information on each other’s past history, i.e., pri-
vate monitoring where each player may observe a different signal. For example,
although a firm cannot directly observe its rival’s action, e.g., prices, it can ob-
serve a noisy signal, e.g., its rival’s sales amounts. Analytical studies on this class
of games have not been very successful. Though the repeated PD with observa-
tion errors has been extensively studied, most papers assume public monitoring
in the literature of economics [17]. This is because finding equilibria in such
games has been considered to be extremely hard. Indeed, it requires very com-
plicated statistical inferences to estimate the history a player reaches at a period
and to compute the continuation payoff from the period on [13]. Notably, a belief-
free approach has successfully established a general characterization where an
equilibrium strategy is constructed so that a player’s belief (about her oppo-
nent) does not matter [11,10]. However, it is not obvious whether the belief-free
approach is helpful in examining the effects of multimarket contact, because we
want to deal with any number of markets. Its tractability may be lost if the num-
ber of markets increases, so that the number of available actions exponentially
increases.
The goal of this paper is to answer the following question: under multimarket
contact with private monitoring, can we find a particular class of strategies
which can sustain a better outcome than an equilibrium strategy for a single
market? For a benchmark, we focus on a strategy found by Ely and Va¨lima¨ki [11]
that attains the optimal payoff among belief-free equilibria in PD. Figure 1
illustrates the strategy, which we call EV, as a variant of the well-known tit-for-
tat strategy.4
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to construct a strategy designed
for multiple markets whose per-market equilibrium payoffs exceed one for a single
market. First, we construct an entirely novel strategy whose behavior is specified
by a nonlinear function of the signal configurations. Precisely, a player chooses
her action at a period according to in which markets she receives bad signals
at the previous period. We call this class of the strategies nonlinear transition,
partial defection (NTPD). Then, we show that the per-market equilibrium payoff
improves when the number of markets is sufficiently large via the theoretical and
numerical analysis.
In the literature of computer science, AI, and multi-agent systems, there are
many streams associated with repeated games [6]: the complexity of equilibrium
computation [16,5,2], multi-agent learning [4,8,19], partially observable stochas-
tic games (POSGs) [12,9,21,18,22], and so on. Among them, POSGs is are the
most relevant to repeated games with private monitoring because they can be
considered as a special case of POSGs. However, POSGs often impose partial
4 Here, g or b is a private signal, which is a noisy observation of opponent actions C
or D. εR or εP represents the transition probability between states. We omit the
remaining ones.
3observability on an opponent’s strategy (behavior rule) and not on opponent’s
past actions [18,22]. They estimate an optimal (best reply) strategy against an
unknown strategy (not always fixed) from perfectly observable actions (perfect
monitoring). In contrast, we verify whether a given strategy profile is a mutual
best reply after any history, i.e., finding an equilibrium, with partially observable
actions (private monitoring). Thus, this paper also addresses understanding the
gap between POSGs and repeated games with private monitoring in economics.
In fact, very few existing works have addressed verifying an equilibrium.
Hansen, Bernstein, and Zilberstein [12] develop an algorithm that iteratively
eliminates dominated strategies. However, just eliminating dominated strategies
is not sufficient to find an equilibrium. Also, the algorithm is not applicable
to an infinitely repeated game. Doshi and Gmytrasiewicz [9] investigate the
computational complexity of achieving equilibria in interactive POMDPs.
Among an enormous number of studies on repeated games in economics, an
important topic has been validity of the folk theorem. Most of them assume
perfet or public monitoring (Please consult the textbook [17]). In case of private
monitoring, a recent paper [20] establishes a general folk theorem. However,
the result is irrelevant to our analysis because the equilibrium strategies are
excessively complicated and require nearly complete patience of the players.
Specializing in multimarket contact, we rather show that the NTPD strategy
forms a highly cooperative equilibrium and only requires the players to be mildly
patient.
2 Model
Two players play M PDs simultaneously in each period. In each PD, each player
chooses either C (cooperation) or D (defection). This is regarded as a model
of oligopolistic competition, where C is an action increasing the total payoffs
(for instance, in the case of price competition, charging a collusive high price),
and D is a non-cooperative one (like a price cut). The players can choose differ-
ent actions over the M PDs, so that each player’s action set in each period is
{C,D}M .
Each player cannot directly observe the other player’s actions, but receives an
imperfect signal about them. In each PD, each player receives either a good signal
g or a bad signal b. We assume that each player receives his signals individually,
and cannot observe the other player’s signals (private monitoring). The pair
of signals they privately receive in each PD is stochastic, following a common
symmetric probability distribution that depends entirely on the action pair of
that PD. We denote it by o(ω1, ω2|a1, a2), where (ω1, ω2) ∈ {g, b}2 and (a1, a2) ∈
{C,D}2. We assume that the signals across the M PDs are independent, though
the signals of a given PD may be correlated across the players. We also assume
that the signal distributions are described by one parameter. There exists p ∈
4(1/2, 1) such that for any i, any ωj (j 6= i) and any a ∈ {C,D}2,
∑
ωi∈{g,b}
o(ωi, ωj |a) =
{
p if (ai, ωj) ∈
{
(C, g), (D, b)
}
,
1− p otherwise.
The marginal distribution of an individual signal in a given PD is such that the
right signal (ωj = g if ai = C, and ωj = b if ai = D) is received with probability
p. We let s = 1 − p, which is the probability of an error. The assumption is
consistent with conditionally independent monitoring, which is a representative
monitoring structure. Formally, a signal distribution is conditionally independent
if o(ωi, ωj | a) = o(ωi | a)o(ωj | a) for all ωi, ωj , and a.
In each PD, player i’s payoff depends only on his action and the signal of
that PD. The payoff function is common to all PDs, denoted by pii(ai, ωi). We
are more interested in the expected payoff function:
gi(a1, a2) =
∑
(ω1,ω2)
pii(ai, ωi)o(ω1, ω2|a1, a2).
We assume that their expected payoff functions are represented by the following
payoff matrix:
C D
C 1, 1 −y, 1 + x
D 1 + x,−y 0, 0
We assume x > 0, y > 0 and 1 > x− y, so that it indeed represents a PD.
All M PDs are played infinitely, in periods t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Player i’s private
history at the beginning of period t ≥ 1 is an element of Hti ≡
[{C,D}M ×
{g, b}M ]t. Let H0i be an arbitrary singleton, and let Hi = ∪t≥0Hti be the set
of player i’s all private histories. Player i’s strategy of this repeated game is a
mapping from Hi to the set of all probability distributions over {C,D}M . That
is, we allow randomized strategies. If the actual play of the repeated game is
such that the action pair
(
am1 (t), a
m
2 (t)
)
is played in the m-th PD in period t for
each m and t, player i’s normalized average payoff is
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
δt
M∑
m=1
gi
(
am1 (t), a
m
2 (t)
)
, (1)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is their common discount factor. The average payoff of any
strategy pair is the expected value of Eq. 1, where the expectation is taken with
respect to the players’ randomizations and the monitoring structure.
The standard solution concept for repeated games with imperfect monitoring
is sequential equilibrium [15], but here we focus on a special class called belief-free
equilibria [10].
Definition 1 (Belief-free equilibrium). A strategy pair is a belief-free equi-
librium if for any t ≥ 0, ht1 ∈ Ht1 and ht2 ∈ Ht2, each player i’s continuation
strategy given hti is optimal against player j’s continuation strategy given h
t
j.
5An important property of the belief-free equilibria is that, while player i
given her private history should, in principle, optimize her continuation payoff
against her belief about player j’s history (and hence his continuation strategy),
her continuation strategy is optimal even if she were to know j’s history with
certainty.5 In other words, the players playing a belief-free equilibrium need not
compute their beliefs in the course of play. When a strategy pair is represented by
finite-state automaton strategies, as will be the case in subsequent analysis, it is
a belief-free equilibrium if any player’s continuation strategy (behavior expanded
from the automaton) starting from any state is a best response (optimal) against
the other player’s continuation strategy starting from any state. Note that we
never restrict the other’s possible strategy space, which includes strategies with
an infinite number of states.
Suppose both players employ a common strategy represented by a two-state
automaton with state space {R,P}. Let Vs1s2 , where s1 ∈ {R,P} and s2 ∈
{R,P}, be player 1’s continuation payoff when (i) player 2 is currently at s2 and
then follows the automaton, and (ii) player 1 always plays the action prescribed
at state s1 at any subsequent history. The strategy pair is a belief-free equilibrium
if and only if there exist VR and VP such that
VRR = VPR = VR, VRP = VPP = VP , (2)
and that Vs2 (s2 ∈ {R,P}) is player 1’s best response payoff against player 2’s
continuation strategy when he is at state s2. To see this, note that by Eq. 2,
player 1 at any history is indifferent between her continuation strategy at state R
and that at state P irrespective of her belief about player 2’s state. Since the
second condition implies that both continuation strategies give her best response
payoff at any history, the conditions for belief-free equilibrium are all satisfied.
Let us explain the EV strategy [11] depicted in Figure 1. A solid line denotes
a deterministic transition and a dashed line denotes a probabilistic transition,
though, for simplicity, we omit some state transition. EV is a representative two-
state automaton strategy that forms a belief-free equilibrium under repeated
games with private monitoring and attains the highest average payoff among
belief-free equilibria in PD. It is parameterized by two numbers, εR ∈ [0, 1] and
εP ∈ [0, 1]. A player first cooperates at state R, but after observing a bad signal,
she punishes (defects) at the next period with probability R, or keep cooperation
with 1 − R. Likewise, after she defects at P , if she observes a good signal, she
returns cooperation with P , or keep defection with 1− P .
Proposition 1. There exist εR ∈ [0, 1] and εP ∈ [0, 1] such that the EV strategy
pair is a belief-free equilibrium if
δ
[
2p− 1− (1− p)(x+ y) + max{x, y}] ≥ max{x, y}. (3)
The average payoff starting from state R is
VR = 1− (1− p)x
2p− 1 . (4)
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Fig. 1: EV strategy
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Fig. 2: NTPD strategy
What happens if there are M(≥ 2) PDs, in comparison with the case of
one PD? If EV forms an equilibrium, it is always an equilibrium to play it in
each PD independently. Obviously, the payoff of this equilibrium is M times
the EV equilibrium payoff. Under this equilibrium, a player’s actions in all PDs
can be quite different, depending on the histories of individual PDs. Thus, the
corresponding automaton has 2M states. The transition probabilities from one
state to another state depends linearly on the number of bad signals. We now ask
how this feature of EV can be modified so that the equilibrium profit increases
with two-state automaton strategies.
3 Nonlinear transition, partial defection strategy
The goal of the analysis of this section is to find a particular class of strategies
which can sustain a better payoff outcome. The strategies in this class are rep-
resentable by two-state automatons, and have the following two features: (i) the
state transition probabilities are not linear in the number of bad signals, and (ii)
defection in some PDs (partial defection) is prescribed at state P . Let us define
the proposed class of strategies, which we call the nonlinear transition, partial
defection (NTPD) strategy, given M PDs:
Definition 2 (NTPD strategy). An NTPD strategy for M(≥ 2) PDs is a
two-state automaton strategy, parameterized by an integer MA such that 1 ≤
MA < M and two numbers ε ∈ [0, 1] and εˆ ∈ [0, 1]. Let A = {1, 2, . . . ,MA} and
B = {MA + 1,MA + 2, . . . ,M}.
– The state space is {R,P}, and R is the initial state.
– At state R, the player is prescribed to choose C in all PDs. At state P , she
is prescribed to choose C in all PDs in A and D in all PDs in B.
– Suppose the current state is R and k is an integer between 0 and MB =
M −MA. Then
1. if b is observed among all PDs in A and there are k bad signals among
the PDs in B, then the state shifts to P with probability 1− (MB − k)εˆ
(and stays at R with the remaining probability).
2. if g is observed among some PD in A and there are k bad signals
among the PDs in B, then the state shifts to P with probability kεˆ (and
stays R with the remaining probability).
5 We refer to player i or 1 as her and to player j or 2 as him throughout this paper.
7– Suppose the current state is P and k is an integer between 0 and MA. Then
1. if g is observed among all PDs in B and there are k bad signals among
the PDs in A, then the state shifts to R with probability ε+εˆ
{
(1−ε)MA−
k
}
(and stays P with the remaining probability).
2. if b is observed among some PD in B and there are k bad signals among
the PDs in A, then the state shifts to R with probability (MA− k)εˆ (and
stays P with the remaining probability).
Figure 2 illustrates NTPD for two PDs in the same manner as Figure 1. Let
us explain how we construct this strategy. A player cooperates in all PDs in A
at state P . Then, she always cooperates in all PDs in A regardless which state
she is in. The transition probabilities from R to P distinguish signals from A
with from B. The increase of transition probabilities is constant for the number
of bad signals from PDs in A. If she observes at least one good signal from A,
it is zero, otherwise, 1−MB εˆ. The transition probabilities further increase by εˆ
in the number of bad signals k in B. For k bad signals from B, the transition
probability from R to P is specified as 1− (MB − k)εˆ if she observes some g in
A, or kεˆ otherwise.
In a similar way, the transition probabilities from P to R are specified. Their
increase is constant for the number of bad signals from PDs in B. If she observes
at least one bad signal from B, it is zero, otherwise, ε − εˆεMA. The transition
probabilities decrease by εˆ in the number of bad signals k in A. For k bad signals
from A, the transition probability from P to R is specified as (MA − k)εˆ if she
observes some b in B, or ε + εˆ{(1 − ε)MA − k} otherwise. We here mix 1 − kεˆ
with (MA−k)εˆ by the last parameter ε.6 In fact, if she observes MA bad signals
in A and MB good signals in B, she transits to R with probability ε− εˆεMA.
3.1 Two PDs
Let us first analyze the case of two PDs.
Theorem 1 (NTPD for two PDs). Fix M = 2 and MA = 1. There exist ε
and εˆ such that the NTPD strategy pair is a belief-free equilibrium if
δ
[
2p− 1− (1− p)y + pmax{x, y}] ≥ x+ max{x, y}. (5)
The average payoff starting from R is
VR = 2−
δ(1− p){2p− 1− px− (1− p)y}
(2p− 1)(1− δp) . (6)
If the coefficient of δ in Eq. 5 is nonpositive, no δ satisfies it. Or if it does
not hold at δ = 1, then no δ satisfies it. Furthermore, if x ≥ 1, Eq. 5 does not
hold under any δ and p. Otherwise, it holds for all sufficiently large δ and p. A
similar argument is applied to the case of M PDs.
6 To solve a system of value equations, we use only two parameters to determine the
transition probabilities.
8Proof. Suppose M = 2 and Eq. 5 hold. Define Eq. 6,
VP = 1 +
px+ (1− p)y
2p− 1 ,
ε =
(1− δp)y
δ
{
2p− 1− (1− p)y}− x , εˆ = (1− δp)xδ{2p− 1− px− (1− p)y} .
From Eq. 5, we obtain
VR > VP , 0 < ε ≤ 1, 0 < εˆ ≤ 1
2
. (7)
Hence the NTPD strategy with ε and εˆ defined above, together with MA = 1,
is well-defined.
Some calculations verify that
VRR = (1− δ)2 + δVRP + δp(VRR − VRP ), (8)
VPR = (1− δ)(2 + x) + δVPP + δ
{
p− (2p− 1)εˆ}(VPR − VPP ), (9)
VRP = (1− δ)(1− y) + δVRP + δp(ε+ εˆ− εεˆ)(VRR − VRP ), (10)
VPP = 1− δ + δVPP + δ
{
pεˆ+ (1− p)ε(1− εˆ)}(VPR − VPP ). (11)
Solving these, we obtain Eq. 2 for VR and VP defined above. These imply that
(i) a player is indifferent between starting with state R and then conforming to
NTPD and starting with state P and then conforming to NTPD, if the other
player starts with either state R or P and then conforming to NTPD, (ii) a
player’s continuation payoff at one of the states when the other player is at
s ∈ {R,P} is Vs.
Let V DCs be a player’s payoff when he selects D in the first PD and C in
the second, and then conforms to NTPD when the other player’s current state
is s ∈ {R,P}. Similarly, let V DDs be a player’s payoff when he selects D in
both PDs, and then conforms to NTPD when the other player’s current state is
s ∈ {R,P}. The proof is complete if we show that Vs ≥ max{V DCs , V DDs } for
any s, i.e., each player at any state has no incentive to deviate from the action
at that state. It is easy to verify that
V DCR = (1− δ)(2 + x) + δ
[{
1− p+ (2p− 1)εˆ}VR + {p− (2p− 1)εˆ}VP ], (12)
V DDR = (1− δ)(2 + 2x) + δ
{
(1− p)VR + pVP
}
, (13)
V DCP = (1− δ)(1 + x− y) + δ
[{
εˆ+ p(ε− εˆ− εεˆ)}VR + {1− εˆ− p(ε− εˆ− εεˆ)}VP ],
(14)
V DDP = (1− δ)(1 + x) + δ
[
(ε+ εˆ− εεˆ)(1− p)VR +
{
1− (ε+ εˆ− εεˆ)(1− p)}VP ].
(15)
From Eqs. 8 and 9, we obtain
(1− δ)x = δ(2p− 1)εˆ(VR − VP ). (16)
Therefore, from Eqs. 8 and 12,
VR − V DCR = −(1− δ)x+ δ(2p− 1)(1− εˆ)(VR − VP )
= δ(2p− 1)(1− 2εˆ)(VR − VP ) ≥ 0,
9where the inequality follows from Eq. 7. From Eqs. 9 and 13, the same argument
shows VR−V DDR ≥ 0. Therefore, from Eqs. 10, 14, and 16, we derive VP−V DCP =
0. As well, Eqs. 11, 15, and 16 imply VP − V DDP = 0.
Corollary 1. Fix M = 2. For any δ, x, y, and p, if NTPD is an equilibrium,
EV is an equilibrium and its payoff is greater than or equal to that of NTPD.
This is straighforwardly derived from Theorem 1. The detailed proof is pro-
vided in Appendix A. Corollary 1 is somewhat negative. In fact, the NTPD’s
average payoff per market achieved in an equilibrium never exceeds that of EV.
However, it is decreasing in the discount factor and is maximized with the lowest
one so that the equilibrium condition is satisfied. With such a discount factor,
if x ≥ y, NTPD performs the same average payoff as EV, though we omit the
calculation due to space constraints. In the next subsection, we show that the
consequence can be reversed when considering more PDs than two.
3.2 M PDs
The following theorem identifies the equilibrium conditions and the average pay-
off for the case of M PDs.
Theorem 2 (NTPD for M PDs). There exist ε and εˆ such that the NTPD
strategy pair is a belief-free equilibrium if
δ
[
x(1− sMA) + sMA−1
{
MB(p− s)− x(MA −MB)p− s
MB (p− s)MBy
pMB − sMB
}]
≥ x(1 + sMA−1MB) and (17)
δ
[
(pMB − sMB ){MB(p− s) + (MA −MB)x(s− sMA)}+MBy(p− s)(1− sMA − sMB )]
≥MAx(pMB − sMB ) +MBy(p− s) (18)
hold. The average payoff starting from R is
VR = M − δs
MA(p− s)(M − VP ) + (1− δ)(s− sMA)MBx
(p− s){1− δ(1− sMA)} , (19)
where VP = MA +
pMAx
p−s +
sMBMBy
pMB−sMB .
Here, we refer to 1 − p as s for simplicity. Even though the proof is provided
in Appendix B, it is basically the same as Theorem 1. Solving the system of
value equations provides VR, VP , ε, and εˆ. The conditions are derived from the
incentive conditions and the feasibility conditions of ε and εˆ. Note that, if p is
sufficiently close to one, the equilibrium conditions are simplified to δ ≈ 1 and
MB > MAx.
The next corollary considers what happens if the numbers of PDs are suffi-
ciently large.
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Corollary 2. Fix x, y, and p. Suppose both MA and MB are sufficiently large
and satisfy
MApx− (MB − 1){2p− 1− (1− p)x} ≥ (1− p)y. (20)
Then if NTPD is an equilibrium for sufficiently large δ, EV is equilibrium, but
its payoff is smaller than that of NTPD.
Proof. If NTPD is an equilibrium, Eqs. 17 and 18 hold. Hence, both of them
evaluated at δ = 1 hold with strict inequality. If MA and MB are sufficiently
large, we have sMA → 0 and sMB → 0. Therefore, the two strict inequalities
imply
MB{2p− 1− (1− p)x} −MApx > 0.
This and Eq. 20 imply that 2p − 1 − (1 − p)(x + y) > 0. It follows from Eq. 3
that EV is an equilibrium for sufficiently large δ.
Furthermore, we show that the NTPD’s average payoff is greater than the
EV’s one. From Eq. 19, the payoff of NTPD when we let sMA → 0 is
M − MB(1− p)x
2p− 1 > M −
M(1− p)x
2p− 1 .
The inequality follows from M > MB . Since the right-hand side is the average
payoff of EV (M times Eq. 4), the proof is complete.
The result is positive unlike Corollary 1. If the numbers of PDs are suffi-
ciently large, NTPD achieves a greater payoff than EV. A question remains:
how many PDs are required so that NTPD still outperforms EV? As we re-
marked at the end of Section 3.1, if we use the lowest discount factor so that
NTPD is an equilibrium, it always outperforms EV, irrespective of the num-
bers of PDs. However, it is hard to analytically investigate cases when players
are mildly patient (δ < 1), because Corollary 2 cannot exactly be applied to
the cases. Therefore, we provide a numerical analysis in Appendix C and show
NTPD can yield better payoffs than EV for a specific number of PDs (M = 6).
4 Discussions
We have seen that NTPD sometimes outperforms EV. What aspects of NTPD
contribute to such results? A key feature involves the nonlinearlity of the transtion
probabilities. In fact that from state R to P does not depend on the outcome in
A at all, as long as it contains at least one good signal. However, if all signals
from A are bad, the transition probability sharply increases. In the former, that
probability is kεˆ where k is the number of bad signals in B. In the latter, it
sharply increases to 1− (MB − k)εˆ. This nonlinearity specifies the NTPD’s first
equilibrium condition in Eq. 17.
Why does this nonlinearity help? Suppose the other player is at state R, and
consider how a player wants to play the PDs in A. Her incentive to play C or
11
D in one PD in A crucially depends on the probability of the event that all
signals among the other PDs in A are bad. Only under that event, is her action
in this PD pivotal. Naturally, the event is more likely when she defects among
more PDs in A. Therefore, her temptation to defect in one PD in A is largest
when she cooperates among all other PDs in A. Note that we apply a similar
argument to this when we check the incentives. This observation implies that
once an NTPD strategy prevents a player from defecting in one PD in A, it
automatically ensures that the player has no incentive to defect in any number
of PDs in A. Therefore, as long as we consider the NTPD strategies, we can
effectively ignore all actions which defect among two or more PDs in A. This
reduction in the number of incentive constraints is a key to the payoff improve-
ment results brought about by NTPD. Conversely, NTPD never outperforms EV
with two PDs as in Corporally 1 because this reduction is ineffective for proving
Theorem 1.
This argument also reveals that the NTPD strategies must involve partial
defection. Due to the nonlinearity, it is suboptimal to defect in all PDs, including
the ones in B. Since the actions at states R and P must be both optimal in a
belief-free equilibrium, full defection cannot be the action at state P .
Alternatively, we suspect a more complicated strategy, i.e., automata with
more than two states, not to improve the payoff. Adding a new cooperation
state is ineffective for achieving an equilibrium, since it gives a player a chance
to exploit her opponent. Because the new state increases the likelihood that a
player cooperates, even if the opponent defects, she is unlikely to shift a pun-
ishment state. Thus, he at a cooperation state can deviate to defect without
being punished. Conversely, adding a punishment state may lead to an equilib-
rium. However, such a strategy inevitably decreases the payoff. Also, the idea of
NTPD can be extended for games beyond PD, e.g., a game where a player has
actions more than three. We can construct some similar strategy if a game has
an efficient outcome, e.g., every player cooperates, and a Nash outcome, e.g.,
every player defects.
5 Conclusions
This paper identifies equilibria in repeated multimarket contact with a noisy
signal. For the first time, we find the multimarket contact effect in the proposed
class of strategies, NTPD, particularly when the number of PDs is large. In
future work, we would like to improve NTPD and to characterize an optimal
equilibrium strategy class.
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Appendices
A Proof of Corollary 1
Let us first show that the NTPD’s equilibrium conditions imply that of EV.
From the equilibrium conditions of EV and NTPD for M = 2 (Eqs. 3 and 5),
we require
δ
[
2p− 1− (1− p)(x+ y) + max{x, y}]
≥δ[2p− 1− (1− p)y + pmax{x, y}]− x.
Then we obtain
δ
[
(1− p)x− (1− p) max{x, y}] ≤ x. (21)
When x ≥ y, Eq. 21 leads to x ≥ 0. This always holds from the definition of
x > 0. When y > x, Eq. 21 leads to δ[(1 − p)(y − x)] ≥ −x. This always holds
because the lefthand side is always positive. Therefore, for any δ, x, y, and p, if
NTPD is an equilibrium, EV is always an equilibrium.
Second, we show that the EV’s average payoff is always greater than or equal
to that of NTPD when it is an equilibrium. From the average payoffs of EV and
NTPD for M = 2 (Eqs. 4 and 6), we require
2− 2(1− p)x
2p− 1 ≥ 2−
δ(1− p){2p− 1− px− (1− p)y}
(2p− 1)(1− δp) .
Then we obtain
δ
[
2p− 1− (1− p)y + px] ≥ 2x. (22)
Next, we show that the equilibrium condition of NTPD for M = 2 (Eq. 5 in the
paper) implies Eq. 22. This requires
δ
[
2p− 1− (1− p)y + px]− x
≥δ[2p− 1− (1− p)y + pmax{x, y}]−max{x, y}.
Since we then obtain max{x, y} ≥ x, this clearly holds. The proof is complete.
B Proof of Theorem 2
Define
εˆ =
x
{
1− δ(1− sMA)}
δ
{
MB(p− s)− x(MAp+MBs−MBsMA)− s
MB (p−s)MBy
pMB−sMB
} .
We claim that the first condition for the theorem implies
0 < εˆ ≤ s
MA−1
1 + sMA−1MB
< 1. (23)
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To see that, note first that
sMA−1
εˆ(1 + sMA−1MB)
=
δsMA−1
{
MB(p− s)− x(MAp+MBs−MBsMA)− s
MB (p−s)MBy
pMB−sMB
}
{
1− δ(1− sMA)}(1 + sMA−1MB)x .
(24)
Further, the first condition for the theorem implies
0 <
{
1− δ(1− sMA)}(1 + sMA−1MB)x
≤ δ
[
sMA−1
{
MB(p− s)− x(MA −MB)p− s
MB (p− s)MBy
pMB − sMB
}
+ x(1− sMA)− (1− sMA)(1 + sMA−1MB)x
]
= δsMA−1
{
MB(p− s)− x(MAp+MBs−MBsMA)− s
MB (p− s)MBy
pMB − sMB
}
.
Substituting this into Eq. 24 yields Eq.23.
Next, define
ε =
MBy(p− s)εˆ
(1−MAεˆ)(pMB − sMB )x.
The second condition for the theorem implies{
MAx(p
MB − sMB ) +MBy(p− s)
}{
1− δ(1− sMA)}
≤ δ
[
(pMB − sMB ){MB(p− s) + (MA −MB)x(s− sMA)}
+MBy(p− s)(1− sMA − sMB )− (1− sMA)
{
MAx(p
MB − sMB ) +MBy(p− s)
}]
= δ
[
(pMB − sMB ){MB(p− s)− x(MAp+MBs−MBsMA)}− (p− s)sMBMBy],
which is equivalent to{
MAx(p
MB − sMB ) +MBy(p− s)
}
εˆ ≤ (pMB − sMB )x.
Rearranging, we obtain
0 < MBy(p− s)εˆ ≤ (1−MAεˆ)(pMB − sMB )x,
which verifies that 0 < ε ≤ 1.
Let us now consider the NTPD strategy with ε and εˆ defined as above. First,
we have the following value equations.
VRR = (1− δ)M + δVRR − δ(VRR − VRP )
{
MBsεˆ+ s
MA(1−MB εˆ)
}
, (25)
VRP = (1− δ)(MA −MBy) + δVRP + δ(VRR − VRP )
{
MApεˆ+ p
MBε(1−MAεˆ)
}
= (1− δ)(MA −MBy) + δVRP + δ(VRR − VRP )
{
MAp+
pMBMBy(p− s)
(pMB − sMB )x
}
εˆ,
(26)
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where Eq. 26 follows from the definition of ε. It follows from Eqs. 25 and 26 that
(1− δ)MB(1 + y)
= (VRR − VRP )
[
1− δ + δsMA +
{
MBs−MBsMA +MAp+ p
MBMBy(p− s)
(pMB − sMB )x
}
δεˆ
]
.
(27)
Note that from the definition of εˆ,
1−δ(1−sMA) = δεˆ
{
MB(p− s)
x
−(MAp+MBs−MBsMA)− s
MB (p− s)MBy
(pMB − sMB )x
}
.
(28)
Let us substitute this into Eq. 27.
(1− δ)MB(1 + y) = δεˆ(VRR − VRP )
{
MB(p− s)
x
− s
MB (p− s)MBy
(pMB − sMB )x +
pMBMBy(p− s)
(pMB − sMB )x
}
=
δεˆMB(1 + y)(p− s)
x
(VRR − VRP ),
from which we have
(1− δ)x = δεˆ(p− s)(VRR − VRP ). (29)
Let us define
VP ≡MA + pMAx
p− s +
sMBMBy
pMB − sMB ,
VR ≡M − δs
MA(p− s)(M − VP ) + (1− δ)(s− sMA)MBx
(p− s){1− δ(1− sMA)} .
We claim that VRR = VR and VRP = VP . First, it follows from Eq. 26 that
VRP = MA −MBy + δ
1− δ (VRR − VRP )
{
MAp+
pMBMBy(p− s)
(pMB − sMB )x
}
εˆ,
and substituting Eq. 29 yields VRP = VP . Next, note that
εˆ =
x
{
1− δ(1− sMA)}
δ
{
(p− s)(M − VP )− (s− sMA)MBx
} . (30)
From Eqs. 25, 29 and 30, we obtain
M − VRR = δ
1− δ (VRR − VRP )
{
MB(s− sMA)εˆ+ sMA
}
=
MBx(s− sMA)
p− s +
xsMA
(p− s)εˆ
=
{
1− δ(1− sMA)}MBx(s− sMA) + δsMA{(p− s)(M − VP )− (s− sMA)MBx}
(p− s){1− δ(1− sMA)}
=
δsMA(p− s)(M − VP ) + (1− δ)(s− sMA)MBx
(p− s){1− δ(1− sMA)} = M − VR.
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Therefore, VRR = VR.
We also have the following value equations.
VPR = (1− δ)(M +MBx) + δVPR − δ(VPR − VPP )
{
MBpεˆ+ s
MA(1−MB εˆ)
}
,
(31)
VPP = (1− δ)MA + δVPP + δ(VPR − VPP )
{
MApεˆ+ s
MBε(1−MAεˆ)
}
= (1− δ)MA + δVPP + δ(VPR − VPP )
{
MAp+
sMBMBy(p− s)
(pMB − sMB )x
}
εˆ, (32)
where Eq. 32 follows from the definition of ε. It follows from Eqs. 31 and 32 that
(1− δ)MB(1 + x)
= (VPR − VPP )
[
1− δ + δsMA +
{
MB(p− sMA) +MAp+ s
MBMBy(p− s)
(pMB − sMB )x
}
δεˆ
]
= (VPR − VPP )δεˆ
{
MB(p− s)
x
−MBs+MBp
}
= (VPR − VPP )δεˆx+ 1
x
MB(p− s),
where the second equality is due to Eq. 28. This is equivalent to
(1− δ)x = δεˆ(p− s)(VPR − VPP ). (33)
From Eq. 32, we have
VPP = MA +
δ
1− δ (VPR − VPP )
{
MAp+
sMBMBy(p− s)
(pMB − sMB )x
}
εˆ,
and substituting Eq. 33 proves VPP = VP . Comparing Eqs. 29 and 33, and using
VPP = VRP , we obtain VPR = VRR = VR.
It suffices to verify that (i) VR is a player’s best response payoff when the
other player is at state R, and (ii) VP is a player’s best response payoff when the
other player is at state P . To this end, let V (dA, dB , s) be a player’s continuation
payoff when he chooses D in some dA PDs in A and in some dB PDs in B and
then conforms to the NTPD strategy from the next period on, given that the
other player is at state s and conforms to the NTPD strategy. The proof is
complete if we show that V (0, 0, s) ≥ V (dA, dB , s) for any dA, any dB , and any
s.
First, note that
V (dA, dB , R) = (1− δ)(M + dAx+ dBx) + δVR
− δ(VR − VP )
[{
(MB − dB)s+ dBp
}
εˆ+ pdAsMA−dA(1−MB εˆ)
]
.
This is linear in dB , and its slope is
(1− δ)x− δ(VR − VP )(p− s)εˆ = 0, (34)
17
where the equality follows from Eq. 29 and VRR − VRP = VR − VP . Hence,
V (dA, dB , R) does not depend on dB . Note also that for any dA,
V (dA, 0, R)− V (dA + 1, 0, R)
= − (1− δ)x+ δ(VR − VP )(pdA+1sMA−dA−1 − pdAsMA−dA)(1−MB εˆ)
= δ(VR − VP )(p− s)
{
pdAsMA−dA−1(1−MB εˆ)− εˆ
}
,
where the last equality is due to Eq. 34. Since p > s, Eq. 23 implies
pdAsMA−dA−1(1−MB εˆ)− εˆ ≥ sMA−1(1−MB εˆ)− εˆ ≥ 0.
Therefore, V (dA, 0, R) ≥ V (dA + 1, 0, R) for any dA. From these, we obtain
V (dA, dB , R) = V (dA, 0, R) =
dA∑
d=1
{
V (d, 0, R)− V (d− 1, 0, R)}+ V (0, 0, R) ≤ V (0, 0, R)
for any dA and any dB , as desired.
Finally, note that
V (dA, dB , P ) = (1− δ)
{
MA + dAx− (MB − dB)y
}
+ δVP
+ δ(VR − VP )
[{
(MA − dA)p+ dAs
}
εˆ+ sdBpMB−dBε(1−MAεˆ)
]
.
This is linear in dA, and its slope is zero by Eq. 34. Hence, V (dA, dB , P ) does
not depend on dA. Note also that for any dB ,
V (0, 0, P )− V (0, dB , P )
= − (1− δ)dBy + δ(VR − VP )ε(1−MAεˆ)(pMB − sdBpMB−dB )
=
y
x
{
− (1− δ)dBx+ δ(VR − VP )MB(p− s)εˆ
pMB − sMB (p
MB − sdBpMB−dB )
}
=
y
x
δ(VR − VP )(p− s)εˆ
{
− dB + MB
pMB − sMB (p
MB − sdBpMB−dB )
}
,
where the second and third equalities follow from the definition of ε and Eq. 34,
respectively. Since p > s, this is concave in dB . Further, it attains the same value
at dB = 0 and dB = MB , and concavity therefore implies that V (0, 0, P ) ≥
V (0, dB , P ) for any dB . Since
V (dA, dB , P ) = V (0, dB , P ) ≤ V (0, 0, P )
for any dA and any dB , the proof is complete.
C Numerical analysis
This section numerically evaluates NTPD. Throughout this section, we fix the
stage game payoffs at x = y = 0.1 and assume a player in NTPD defects in the
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half number of the PDs at state P .7 Figure 3 examines the average payoffs of
NTPD and EV with six PDs (M = 6 and MB = MA = 3). The x-axis indicates
the correctness of signals p while the y-axis indicates the average payoffs per
PD. We plot the NTPD’s payoffs with δ ∈ {0.7, 0.8, 0.9}. We show only the EV’s
payoff with δ = 0.7 because the payoff is independent of δ and, for lower δ, only
the lower limit of p decreases.
EV is an equilibrium in the range of p ∈ [0.56, 0.99] and the payoffs increase
as p does. EV is clearly an equilibrium in a wider range than NTPD for any
discount factor: NTPD is an equilibrium when p ∈ [0.64, 0.83] for δ = 0.7,
p ∈ [0.60, 0.88] for δ = 0.8, and p ∈ [0.58, 0.92] for δ = 0.9. Such an upper bound
of p that NTPD is an equilibrium exists for a given δ because Eq. 17 requires δ
to be high when p is high. A lower bound exists because Eq. 17 unlikely holds
simply because the lefthand side is small and the righthand side is large when p
is low. The NTPD’s average payoffs are basically outperformed by the EV’s one
with δ = 0.9. However, as δ is lowered, the NTPD’s payoffs gradually increase.
When δ = 0.7, NTPD always outperforms EV with a maximum 4.75 % increase
and a minimum 0.87 % increase. In addition, we confirm that a further low
discount factor admittedly magnifies the difference as do larger numbers of PDs
(M > 6) and that, if M > 6, there exists some parameter setting such that, if
NTPD is an equilibrium, EV is an equilibrium and its payoff is greater than that
of NTPD.
It must be emphasized that whether this improvement is subtle depends on
how much a player actually values the payoffs. For example, if she is a president
of a firm and the sales are a million dollars per month, a few percent increase
definitely deserves her attention. This is also a reason why we assume that the
gain from defection x and the loss caused by the opponent’s defection y are
small. In any case, besides the case of large MA and MB covered by Corollary 2,
we could construct NTPD beating EV when the number of markets is relatively
small.
The next question addresses whether NTPD achieves an optimal payoff among
possible equilibrium strategies. We examine how efficient the NTPD’s transition
from state R. Under perfect or public monitoring, it is known that a player’s
equilibrium payoff vector can be computed independently from the opponent’s
one. Dynamic programming can derive the bounds of the equilibrium payoff of
each player, i.e., a self-generation set [1]. It is guaranteed that an equilibrium
strategy with a payoff vector in the set exists.
Under private monitoring, this is generally impossible. However, if an equi-
librium is belief-free, since it satisfies an exchangeability property, the payoff set
has a product structure [10]. Thus, given a continuation payoff starting from
state P , the upper bound of one from state R is computed by the following
linear programming:
7 We confirm that this fraction performs best when NTPD can be an equilibrium,
irrespective of the total number of PDs M .
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max vi
s.t. vi ≥ (1− δ)∑aj α(aj)gi(ai, aj)
+ δ
[∑
ωj
∑
aj
oj(ωj | ai, aj)α(aj)zi(aj , ωj)
]
for each ai ∈ {C,D}M , with equality for each ai ∈ {fi(R), fi(P )},
zi(aj , ωj) ≤ vi for all aj ∈ {C,D}M and ωj ∈ {g, b}M ,
zi(aj , ωj) ≥ VP for all aj ∈ {C,D}M and ωj ∈ {g, b}M ,∑
aj∈{C,D}M α(aj) = 1, and α(aj) ∈ [0, 1] for all aj ∈ {C,D}
M .
Note that i 6= j, if i = 1, j = 2, otherwise j = 1. The first constraints are in-
centive constraints: if a player obtains vi when she employs a strategy, deviating
from the strategy is not profitable. fi(R) or fi(P ) indicates actions specified at
state R or P . The decision variables are player j’s mixed action α(aj) and the
product of the mixed action and i’s continuation payoff that is dependent on j’s
current action and observation α(aj)zi(aj , ωj). If i’s action is specified at a state,
the constraints must be defined with equality to satisfy belief-freeness. The next
two specify the feasible bounds of the equilibrium payoffs. VP is given a priori,
i.e., the NTPD’s average payoff starting from state P . Thus, the solution implies
maximizing the continuation payoff starting from state R. The last two define
the feasibility for α(aj).
Figure 4 illustrates the NTPD’s efficiency, i.e., the ratio of the NTPD’s aver-
age payoff to the optimal payoff. The x- and y-axes indicate the ratio and signal
correctness p, respectively. We fix the discount factor at δ = 0.8. When M = 2 or
4, the efficiency decreases once, increases in p, and reaches 0.99 and 0.98. When
M = 6, it reaches 0.99, though NTPD is no longer an equilibrium when p ex-
ceeds 0.88. Observe that, when M = 6, NTPD performs at over 90% efficiency.8
There is a room for improving the NTPD’s transitions from R. Whether we can
further improve the transition is our immediate future work.
8 For the larger number of PDs (M > 6), we are unable to solve the linear program-
ming by CPLEX 12.5 on Windows 8.1 Pro x64 PC with a Core i7-3960X and 32GB
RAM.
